Moral judgments are often biased against members of groups stereotyped as immoral (e.g., gay men, African Americans). We propose that these biases can be influenced by the framing of moral judgments. Building on the shifting standards model, we hypothesized that minimum (vs. confirmatory) standards judgments, which may elicit lower expectations for groups stereotyped as immoral, would induce people to make more lenient moral judgments for these groups. Furthermore, we predicted that people higher in social dominance orientation, who tend to express negative attitudes toward stigmatized groups, would be more likely to demonstrate such group-based biases in moral judgments. Across three studies, framing judgments in terms of minimum (vs. confirmatory) standards influenced moral judgments regarding gay (vs. straight) men and Black (vs. White) men, and this effect was observed primarily among higher-sdo participants. however, leading people to develop a more expansive circle of moral regard eliminated these group-based moral biases.
cording to confirmatory or minimum standards (Biernat, Fuegen, & Kobrynowicz, 2010) .
Confirmatory standards refer to the amount of evidence perceived to be necessary to confirm that an individual possesses an attribute. Because women are stereotyped as less competent than men, people set higher confirmatory standards for women in determining whether an individual is competent. That is, people require more evidence of skill to confirm that a woman is competent, because additional evidence is necessary to offset the expectation that women are less competent (Biernat & Kobrynowicz, 1997) . Confirmatory standards are typically higher for members of groups that are stereotyped as deficient in the attribute being assessed.
By contrast, minimum standards refer to the amount of evidence perceived to be necessary to believe that an individual meets the minimal required level of an attribute. In the case of gender and competence, people require less evidence of skill to deem a woman as meeting the minimum standards of competence, because it is easier for women to overcome the lower expectations of competence that people have for them ("she's good, for a woman"; Biernat & Kobrynowicz, 1997) . Minimum standards tend to be lower for members of groups stereotyped as deficient in the attribute being assessed (Biernat & Fuegen, 2001; Biernat, Ma, & Nario-Redmond, 2008) . Thus, people set higher standards for groups stereotyped as deficient in the attribute being assessed when judgments are framed in terms of confirmatory standards, but set lower standards for these groups when judgments are framed in terms of minimum standards.
We propose that group-based biases in moral judgments may similarly result from shifting moral standards for groups that are (vs. are not) stereotyped as immoral. Because people tend to seek confirmatory evidence for their beliefs about a group (Darley & Gross, 1983) , they are likely to generally set higher moral standards for, and make more negative moral judgments about, stigmatized groups stereotyped as immoral; however, we propose that framing judgments in terms of minimum standards might reverse this effect. Thus, although members of these groups may find it easier to be perceived as meeting a minimal required level of moral character, they may find it more difficult to be confirmed as moral individuals.
We further reasoned that group-based biases in moral judgment would emerge particularly among individuals who tend to categorize some groups as moral and others as immoral. To capture such individual differences, we measured Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) , "the extent that one desires that one's in-group dominate and be superior to out-groups" (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994, p. 742) . Because higher-SDO individuals seek to morally justify group-based oppression and inequality (Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006) , they may also believe that some groups are less moral than others. Although little research has examined the role of SDO in moral biases specifically, higher SDO is generally associated with strong negative attitudes toward various stigmatized groups (e.g., homosexuals and ethnic minorities; Pratto et al., 1994) . Thus, because higher levels of SDO are associated with stronger endorsement of justi-fications for group-based hierarchy (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) , we predicted that higher-SDO individuals would more strongly exhibit shifting standards effects in moral judgments of stigmatized groups stereotyped as immoral.
We conducted three studies to test these hypotheses. Although previous research has differentiated between components of morality (e.g., the five moral foundations; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010) , our studies examined global impressions of people's morality collapsing across these components (following other researchers; e.g., Janoff-Bulman, Sheik, & Hepp, 2009; Phalet & Poppe, 1997) . This allowed us to examine whether shifting moral standards would be observed across multiple moral dimensions, encompassing the concept of morality more broadly. In Study 1, we sought to demonstrate that higher-SDO individuals would employ shifting moral standards in their moral judgments of gay (vs. straight) men. In Study 2, we investigated whether the effects of shifting moral standards were specific to groups stereotyped in the moral domain, rather than generalizing to any stigmatized group more broadly. In Study 3, we examined whether higher-SDO individuals would also employ shifting moral standards in their moral judgments of Black (vs. White) men, and explored circumstances under which this bias could be eliminated.
sTuDy 1
In Study 1, participants read about a gay or straight man named "Michael" and were asked to make moral judgments regarding Michael's suitability to be a doctor. In a paradigm adapted from that used by Biernat et al. (2010) to study judgments of competence, we measured how much evidence participants required to deem Michael as not having the moral virtue required to be a doctor (confirmatory standards condition) or as not meeting the minimum standards of moral virtue required to be a doctor (minimum standards condition). Because we were interested in negative moral judgments, in both conditions we examined the amount of evidence participants required to deem Michael "not moral."
The shifting standards model predicts that, when evaluating targets stereotyped as deficient in the trait being assessed, people set a less stringent threshold for deciding whether the target meets a minimal requirement for possessing the trait than for confirming that the target possesses the trait. Thus, for instance, a gay man (stereotyped as deficient in morality; e.g., Beere, 1990 ) who demonstrates evidence that he lacks morality might be confirmed as not moral, but may nonetheless be perceived as meeting the minimal necessary threshold of moral character. In the present study, this pattern would be reflected in participants requiring more evidence to decide that a gay man did not meet the minimum (vs. confirmatory) standards of morality. We expected that this pattern would occur more strongly among higher-SDO participants.
Method
Participants. Participants (N = 158; 102 women; mean age = 34.91, SD = 11.95) were recruited through a research website hosted by a university in return for a chance to win a gift certificate.
Procedure and Measures. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (Target: gay vs. straight) × 2 (Standard: minimum vs. confirmatory) between-subjects design. Participants read about "Michael," whose sexual orientation was varied by describing him as living with his partner, "Mark" or "Margaret." We asked participants to make a moral judgment about Michael's suitability to be a doctor (following Biernat et al., 2010) . In the confirmatory standards condition, participants were asked, "What kind of information would you need to know before you were able to answer 'No, Michael does NOT have the moral virtue required of a doctor'?" In the minimum standards condition, participants were asked, "What kind of information would you need to know before you were able to answer 'No, Michael does NOT meet the minimum standards of moral virtue required of a doctor'?" Participants then read, sequentially, about different immoral behaviors performed by Michael (e.g., "In a dispute with his parents, Michael became angry and cursed in their faces"; items were adapted from Graham & Haidt, 2011 , and designed to elicit moral judgments). For each behavior, participants indicated whether they had received enough information to deem Michael as lacking moral virtue. The task continued until participants indicated that they were convinced that Michael did not have the moral virtue (or minimum standards of moral virtue) to be a doctor, or until they had read ten behaviors. We recorded the number of behaviors participants read. In all conditions, fewer behaviors read implied that participants required less evidence to make their decisions, and differences as a function of Michael's sexual orientation reflected bias. Participants then completed the 16-item SDO-6 scale (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999 ; 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree; α = .93). SDO scores did not differ by condition. Seven participants with incomplete data (unrelated to condition) and one outlier on SDO (z = 3.97) were excluded from analyses, yielding a final sample of N = 150. We conducted a linear regression analysis on the number of behaviors required to deem the target as not moral (overall M = 6.01, SD = 2.83). The predictors were Target (0 = straight, 1 = gay), Standard (0 = confirmatory, 1 = minimum), SDO (continuous, mean-centered; M = 2.71, SD = 1.06), and all interactions. The model accounted for 11% of the variance, F(7, 142) = 2.60, p = .015 (see Table 1 ). Although the 2-way Target × Standard interaction was nonsignificant, p = .530, the predicted 3-way interaction emerged, b = 2.33, SE = 0.89, p = .009 (see Figure  1) . We examined the effects of Target and Standard separately for participants high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) in SDO. The Target × Standard interaction was significant among high-SDO participants, b = 3.04, SE = 1.31, p = .022. When Michael was gay, high-SDO participants required more information to deem Michael as not meeting the minimum standards of morality than to confirm that he was not moral, b = 1.87, SE = 0.93, p = .046. In contrast, when Michael was straight, the amount of information sought did not differ between standards, p = .207. All effects were nonsignificant among low-SDO participants, ps ≥ .144.
dIsCUssIon
Consistent with our hypothesis that the use of shifting standards may be associated with group hierarchy-enhancing motivations, Study 1 revealed that when evaluating the moral character of gay men, who are stereotyped as immoral (or FIGUre 1. the number of immoral behaviors read by high-and low-sdo participants before deeming a gay or straight man as not having the moral virtue (confirmatory standards) or the minimum standards of moral virtue (minimum standards) required to be a doctor (study 1). deficient in morality relative to straight men), higher-SDO individuals set different confirmatory and minimum standards for gay (but not straight) men: They required more evidence to deem a gay man as not meeting the minimum standards of moral virtue, relative to confirming that a gay man lacked moral virtue. Lower-SDO participants did not show this pattern of bias.
Our results align with other findings that the use of shifting standards can be moderated by relevant individual differences (Biernat & Sesko, 2013) . Given that shifting moral standards may be associated with the motivation to legitimize perceptions of some groups as more moral than others (Miron, Branscombe, & Biernat, 2010) , shifting moral standards are likely to be employed primarily by higher-SDO individuals, who are motivated to justify hierarchical group relations (Pratto et al., 2006) . Indeed, our findings suggest that, along with other hierarchyjustifying ideologies (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) , shifting moral standards may be effective in legitimizing the subordinate status of stigmatized groups. Thus, from this perspective, lower-SDO people who are motivated to attenuate hierarchical group relations (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) would be unlikely to employ shifting moral standards, as suggested by our findings.
Although one might generally expect people to require more information for confirmatory than minimum standards, this main effect is in fact not predicted by the shifting standards model (Biernat, 2012) . Moreover, the fact that we did not find an overall shifting standards effect collapsed across SDO may appear to conflict with some previous work that has found overall, unmoderated shifting standards effects (e.g., Biernat et al., 2010 ; but see Biernat & Sesko, 2013) . One possible explanation is that moral judgments differ from other types of judgments in important ways (Wojciszke, 2005) . Moral judgments, which reflect firmly held personal values (Skitka, 2010) , and SDO, which represents ideological values regarding the appropriate nature of group relations in society (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) , converge more strongly around one's core values than do perceptions of competence normally used in work on shifting standards .
However, we note that although we hypothesized that shifting moral standards would be observed only with respect to groups stereotyped as immoral, Study 1 does not allow us to rule out the possibility that these effects would emerge for groups that are negatively evaluated on other dimensions (e.g., disliked). In addition, because participants in Study 1 were likely to have been predominantly heterosexual (although we did not collect this demographic information in Study 1), it is possible that shifting moral standards are employed depending on whether targets are members of outgroups (vs. ingroups), and not necessarily groups that are (vs. are not) stereotyped as immoral. Study 2 was designed to address these possibilities.
sTuDy 2
In Study 2, we sought to determine whether the effects of shifting moral standards are specific to stigmatized groups stereotyped as immoral, rather than more gener-ally applying to groups that are evaluated negatively on any dimension. We therefore compared shifting moral standards with respect to gay men (stigmatized and stereotyped as immoral) and Asians (stigmatized but not stereotyped as immoral). Asians are stereotyped as competent but unsociable, and are thus viewed with resentment, envy, and discomfort (Lin, Kwan, Cheung, & Fiske, 2005) . Individuals who harbor anti-Asian prejudice are less interested in interacting with Asians, and tend to form more negative impressions of Asian individuals (Lin et al., 2005) . Although one might assume that Asians' status as a "model minority" elicits respect and admiration, Asians are instead often the target of dislike and derogation (Cheryan & Monin, 2005; Lin et al., 2005) .
If the shifting standards effects observed in Study 1 are attributable not specifically to morality but rather to negative evaluation more generally, we would expect to find evidence of shifting moral standards for both gay men and Asians (because both groups are evaluated negatively, albeit for different reasons). If, however, we are correct that the shifting standards effects observed in Study 1 are specific to the moral dimension, we would expect to observe shifting moral standards for gay men but not Asians (because gay men, but not Asians, are stereotyped as immoral). In Study 2, we followed a similar procedure as in Study 1 but compared the effects of shifting moral standards for a gay versus Asian target. We expected to find evidence of shifting moral standards-requiring more evidence to decide that an individual did not meet the minimum (vs. confirmatory) standards of morality-among higher-SDO participants evaluating a gay target.
Moreover, we sought to address the possibility that shifting moral standards merely reflect the employment of differing moral standards for outgroup (vs. ingroup) members, rather than for members of groups stereotyped (vs. not stereotyped) as immoral. In Study 2, we therefore focused on participants who were neither gay males nor Asian, ensuring that all participants evaluated outgroup targets. Thus, observing differences in shifting moral standards between the gay and Asian targets would demonstrate that shifting moral standards are not merely a function of evaluating outgroup (vs. ingroup) targets.
Method
Participants. Participants (N = 553; 281 women; mean age = 33.06, SD = 11.91) were recruited through Amazon.com's MTurk.
Procedure and Measures. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (Target: gay vs. Asian) × 2 (Standard: minimum vs. confirmatory) betweensubjects design. Participants read about "David," who was depicted as a White male with a partner named "Jake" (in the gay target condition) or as an Asian male with a partner named "Jane" (in the Asian target condition). Again adapting the procedure employed by Biernat et al. (2010) , we asked participants to evaluate David's moral character. Previous work has used several methodologies to measure shifting standards, and we used a slightly different methodology than that of Study 1 to ensure that our findings generalize across operationalizations. Participants read that we were interested in "the MINIMUM number of behaviors that are necessary to SUSPECT that David is NOT moral" (minimum standards condition) or "the TOTAL number of behaviors that are necessary to CONFIRM that David is NOT moral" (confirmatory standards condition). Participants then read, sequentially, about immoral behaviors performed by David and were asked to indicate when they had received enough information to suspect (or confirm) David's lack of morality. Fewer behaviors read implied that participants required less evidence to make their decisions. Participants then completed the SDO-6 scale (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999 ; 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree; α = .93). SDO scores did not differ by condition.
resULts
In order to ensure that all participants evaluated an outgroup target, we excluded 46 participants who were either gay men or Asian.
1 In addition, six participants with incomplete data and nine outliers on SDO (zs > 2.51), unrelated to condition, were excluded from analyses, yielding a final sample of N = 492. We conducted a linear regression analysis on the number of behaviors required to deem the target as not moral (overall M = 4.30, SD = 2.08). The predictors were Target (0 = gay, 1 = Asian), Standard (0 = minimum, 1 = confirmatory), SDO (continuous, meancentered; M = 2.36, SD = 1.02), and all interactions. The model accounted for 17% of the variance, F(7, 484) = 2.04, p = .048 (see Table 2 ).
Although the Target × Standard interaction was nonsignificant, p = .977, the predicted 3-way interaction emerged, b = 0.75, SE = 0.37, p = .040 (see Figure 2) . We examined the effects of Standard and SDO separately for participants evaluating the gay or Asian targets. The Standard × SDO interaction was significant among participants evaluating the gay target, b = -0.92, SE = 0.27, p = .001. When David was gay, high-SDO participants required more information to deem David as not meeting the minimum standards of morality than to confirm that he was not moral, b = -0.88, SE = 0.39, p = .023. Unexpectedly, low-SDO participants required less information to deem David as not meeting the minimum standards of morality 1. Using similar group-based exclusion criteria was not feasible in Study 1 (because demographic information on sexual orientation was not collected) and did not change the results of Study 3. than to confirm that he was not moral, b = 1.01, SE = 0.39, p = .010. All effects were nonsignificant among participants evaluating the Asian target, ps ≥ .116.
dIsCUssIon
As predicted, we found that shifting moral standards were observed only with respect to the gay, but not Asian, target. Specifically, higher-SDO participants required more evidence to suspect (vs. confirm) that a gay man was not moral, replicating the pattern of results found in Study 1. In contrast, participants did not employ shifting moral standards for the Asian target. These results are consistent with our reasoning that the effects found in Study 1 are specific to the moral domain, and do not simply reflect negative evaluation in any domain (e.g., dislike). Indeed, if it were the case that individuals employ shifting standards based merely on which groups they like or dislike, we would have observed shifting standards for both the gay and Asian targets, but this is not what we found. In addition, the present findings also demonstrate that these effects are unlikely to merely reflect different standards for outgroup (vs. ingroup) targets, because both targets were outgroup members for participants in this study.
Interestingly, lower-SDO participants showed the opposite pattern as higher-SDO participants, requiring less evidence to suspect (vs. confirm) that a gay man was not moral. Because lower-SDO participants tend to endorse hierarchy-attenuating beliefs, perhaps they make moral judgments in a way that actually favors members of stigmatized groups. This explanation makes sense in the current political context, with many individuals actively involved in advocacy efforts for gay rights, such that individuals with hierarchy-attenuating beliefs may have particularly positive attitudes toward gay men. Indeed, the finding that lower-SDO participants required less information to deem a gay man as not meeting the minimum (vs. confirmatory) standards of morality raises the interesting possibility that these participants may even perceive gay men as more moral than straight men.
FIGUre 2. the number of immoral behaviors read by high-and low-sdo participants before confirming (confirmatory standards) or suspecting (minimum standards) that a gay or Asian man was not moral (study 2).
Study 3 further investigated the role of shifting standards in moral judgments, extending the work to judgments of Black and White targets, and examining whether the biases demonstrated by higher-SDO individuals could be reduced.
sTuDy 3
Group-based moral biases may be influenced by people's "circle of moral regard," or the range of entities people deem worthy of moral consideration (Houlette et al., 2004; Laham, 2009; Reed & Aquino, 2003) . People with a smaller circle of moral regard perceive a narrow set of others (e.g., only family and kin) as worthy of moral consideration, whereas people with a larger circle of moral regard include a larger set of social groups (e.g., members of different religious or racial groups) within their moral consideration (Laham, 2009) . A more expansive circle of moral regard is associated with less negative attitudes, intentions, and behaviors toward stigmatized groups (Reed & Aquino, 2003) . We reasoned that leading people to develop a more expansive moral circle might reduce group-based moral biases among higher-SDO individuals, based on previous research suggesting that leading higher-SDO individuals to include disadvantaged groups in their sense of self and within a common ingroup identity (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001 ) alleviates biased behaviors (Freeman, Aquino, & McFerran, 2009) .
In Study 3, we manipulated the size of participants' circle of moral regard and measured shifting standards in moral judgments for Black (vs. White) targets. First, using a procedure developed by Laham (2009) , we led participants to generate an expansive or a non-expansive circle of moral regard. Next, participants read about "Jacob," whose race was varied by a photograph that depicted him as either Black or White, and then evaluated Jacob's moral character. Specifically, participants completed a task measuring how much evidence was necessary to make judgments about the target's immorality. In Study 3, we directly asked participants to make decisions about whether the target was immoral (rather than "not moral," as in Studies 1 and 2); changing the wording allowed us to examine whether shifting moral standards could be observed for both operationalizations of moral judgment. The shifting standards pattern is expected to emerge primarily with respect to targets stereotyped as deficient in the trait being assessed ("immorality" in the present study). Accordingly, in contrast to Studies 1 and 2 where we obtained a shifting moral standards effect with regard to the stigmatized target, in Study 3 we predicted that participants would set differential minimum (vs. confirmatory) standards for the White target (who is stereotyped as deficient in immorality) rather than the Black target (see Biernat et al., 2010) .
We expected to conceptually replicate the pattern of results obtained in Studies 1 and 2 in the non-expansive circle of moral regard condition. That is, we expected that among higher-SDO individuals, lower expectations of immorality for Whites might make it relatively easy for a White man to trigger the suspicion of immorality (i.e., minimum standards), but more evidence of immorality would be required before confirming that a White man is immoral (i.e., confirmatory standards). Fur-thermore, we anticipated that leading participants to develop an expansive circle of moral regard would moderate-specifically, temper-the effect of SDO, generally producing results similar to those of lower-SDO individuals in Studies 1 and 2.
Method
Participants. Participants (N = 207; 124 women; mean age = 33.53, SD = 12.13) were recruited through Amazon.com's MTurk.
Procedure and Measures. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (Circle of Moral Regard: non-expansive vs. expansive) × 2 (Standard: minimum vs. confirmatory) × 2 (Target: Black vs. White) between-subjects design. We first manipulated participants' circle of moral regard utilizing Laham's (2009) procedure. Participants received a list of 20 entities (e.g., young girl, fetus, brain-dead person) and read: "When we think about entities in the world, we might feel a moral obligation to show concern for the welfare and interests of some of those entities." Participants in the non-expansive circle of moral regard condition were asked to "circle those that you feel morally obligated to show concern for by dragging them into the box on the right," whereas participants in the expansive circle of moral regard condition were asked to "cross out those entities that you do not feel morally obligated to show concern for by dragging them into the box on the right." The number of entities circled (in the non-expansive circle of moral regard condition) or not crossed out (in the expansive circle of moral regard condition) reflected the expansiveness of participants' circle of moral regard, and was used as a manipulation check (following Laham, 2009 Next, participants read about "Jacob," whose race was varied by a photograph that depicted him as either White or Black. We then asked participants to evaluate Jacob's moral character. As in Study 2, participants read that we were interested in "the MINIMUM number of behaviors that are necessary to SUSPECT that Jacob is immoral" (minimum standards condition) or "the TOTAL number of behaviors that are necessary to CONFIRM that Jacob is immoral" (confirmatory standards condition). Participants then read, sequentially, about immoral behaviors performed by Jacob and were asked to indicate when they had received enough information to suspect (or confirm) Jacob's immorality. Fewer behaviors read implied that participants required less evidence to make their decisions, and differences as a function of Jacob's race reflected bias. Participants then completed the SDO-6 scale (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999 ; 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree; α = .94). SDO scores did not differ by condition. 
resULts
Ten participants with incomplete data or who did not follow the instructions and one outlier on SDO (z = 3.11) were excluded from analyses, yielding a final sample of N = 196.
Manipulation Check. Participants in the expansive circle of moral regard condition generated a larger circle of moral regard (M = 16.10, SD = 3.43) than participants in the non-expansive circle of moral regard condition (M = 9.73, SD = 4.40), t(194) = -11.28, p < .001, d = 1.61, confirming that the manipulation was successful.
Main Analyses. We conducted a linear regression analysis on the number of behaviors required to deem the target as immoral (overall M = 4.58, SD = 2.33). The predictors were Circle of Moral Regard (0 = non-expansive, 1 = expansive), Target (0 = Black, 1 = White), Standard (0 = confirmatory, 1 = minimum), SDO (continuous, mean-centered; M = 2.49, SD = 1.09), and all interactions. The model accounted for 14% of the variance, F(15, 180) = 1.91, p = .025 (see Table 3 ).
We found a 3-way interaction between Circle of Moral Regard, Target, and Standard, b = -2.58, SE = 1.34, p = .056. Simple slopes analyses revealed that the Target × Standard interaction was significant in the non-expansive circle of moral regard condition, b = 1.97, SE = 0.93, p = .037. Within the non-expansive circle of moral regard condition, when Jacob was White, participants required marginally more information to confirm, relative to suspect, that he was immoral, b = 1.29, SE = 0.71, p = .069. In contrast, when Jacob was Black, the amount of information sought did not differ between standards, p = .271. No effects were significant in the expansive circle of moral regard condition, ps ≥ .129.
In addition, the expected 4-way interaction was obtained, b = -2.50, SE = 1.26, p = .048 (see Figure 3) . We examined the joint effects of Circle of Moral Regard, Target, and Standard separately for participants high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) in SDO. The 3-way interaction was significant among high-SDO participants, b = -5.32, SE = 1.86, p = .005. Corroborating the results of Studies 1 and 2, among high-SDO participants who were led to have a non-expansive circle of moral regard, the Target × Standard interaction was significant, b = 3.68, SE = 1.24, p = .003. High-SDO participants required more information to confirm (vs. suspect) that Jacob was immoral when he was White, b = 2.57, SE = 0.86, p = .003, whereas the amount of information sought did not differ between standards when Jacob was Black, p = .211. In contrast, high-SDO participants who were led to have an expansive circle of moral regard did not employ shifting moral standards, as demonstrated by the nonsignificant Target × Standard interaction, p = .244. Among low-SDO participants, all effects were nonsignificant, ps ≥ .121.
dIsCUssIon
Study 3, which included a manipulation of participants' circle of moral regard, found an interaction between standard type and target's race consistent with the general operation of shifting standards but, like Studies 1 and 2, also revealed critical moderation by SDO. When participants were not led to have a more expansive moral circle, the results conceptually replicated those of Studies 1 and 2: Only higher-SDO participants employed shifting moral standards depending on the target's race. However, when participants were induced to have a more expansive moral circle, higher-SDO participants, like lower-SDO participants, did not demonstrate shifting moral standards. These findings suggest that a more expansive circle of moral regard can reduce bias among higher-SDO individuals.
One distinction between Study 3 and the previous two studies is that the difference between confirmatory and minimum standards emerged with respect to the stigmatized group (gay men) in Studies 1 and 2, but with respect to the nonstigmatized group (White men) in Study 3. These distinct patterns likely emerged due to differences in the types of bias examined in the two studies. In general, because there are stronger societal sanctions against racial bias than against bias toward gay men (Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002) , bias against Blacks is often expressed more indirectly, such as in terms of pro-White favoritism . This may explain why shifting standards were observed with respect to the White target, reflecting a positive evaluation of Whites as less immoral than Blacks. Moreover, we asked participants to evaluate the targets' morality in Studies 1 and 2 and the targets' immorality in Study 3. The difference between confirmatory and minimum standards is expected to emerge for the group stereotyped as deficient in the trait being assessed ; indeed, this pattern was observed with respect to gay men ("deficient" in morality) in Studies 1 and 2, and with respect to White men ("deficient" in immorality) in Study 3, as anticipated.
A question that may be raised regarding Study 3 is whether the manipulations of non-expansive (vs. expansive) circles of moral regard and of confirmatory (vs. minimum) standards were completely independent of one another. For instance, one might suggest that manipulating people's circle of moral regard could itself trigger the use of confirmatory (vs. minimum) standards to evaluate whether individuals are worthy of moral concern. However, we note that a non-expansive (vs. expansive) circle of moral regard does not necessarily map onto confirmatory (vs. minimum) standards, because it is possible to frame both a non-expansive and expansive circle of moral regard in terms of either confirmatory or minimum standards. Individuals could consider the threshold at which they confirm (vs. suspect) that a group does not merit moral concern (expansive circle of moral regard), or the threshold at which they confirm (vs. suspect) that a group does merit moral concern (non-expansive circle of moral regard). Thus, we would not predict a priori that non-expansive or expansive circles of moral regard correspond to either confirmatory or minimum standards. Instead, we suggest that manipulating people's circle of moral regard affected our results primarily by leading people to incorporate stigmatized groups into their sense of self, reducing the expression of bias.
general DisCussion
The present research extended work on shifting standards (Biernat, 2009) to the domain of moral judgments and considered the moderating roles of SDO and the circle of moral regard. Because higher-SDO individuals endorse group-based hierarchy (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) , they may be more inclined to make biased moral judgments. Shifting moral standards may reflect the perceived inferiority of groups stereotyped as immoral, and the expectation that these groups will behave immorally. In the present research, higher-SDO participants displayed shifting standards in their moral judgments involving gay versus straight men and Blacks versus Whites when moral inclusiveness was not emphasized. Also consistent with work on social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) , across our three studies and the different conditions of Study 3, lower-SDO people, who are motivated to attenuate rather than enhance group hierarchy, did not demonstrate shifting moral standards. However, as demonstrated in Study 3, leading people to have a more expansive circle of moral regard can reduce the propensity of higher-SDO people to employ shifting standards when judging the morality of members of stigmatized groups. Our results are consistent with previous research demonstrating that a more expansive circle of moral regard, which increases concern for the welfare of stigmatized groups (Reed & Aquino, 2003) , is one way to reduce stereotype-based judgments regarding the morality of stigmatized groups, particularly among people motivated to support or enhance hierarchical relations between groups (i.e., higher-SDO people).
There are several potential explanations as to why SDO emerged as a crucial moderator of shifting moral standards. One possibility is that higher-SDO people more strongly endorse stereotypes of stigmatized groups as immoral, and are therefore more likely to employ shifting moral standards. Another possible explanation is that higher-SDO people are motivated to employ shifting moral standards in order to preserve hierarchical differences between groups. By setting standards of morality that make people particularly likely to confirm stigmatized group members' deficient morality (as in Studies 1 and 2), or unlikely to confirm advantaged group members' immorality (as in Study 3), higher-SDO people may seek to maintain their perceptions of stigmatized groups as distinctly less moral. Previous research has found support for motivational explanations of shifting standards, demonstrating for instance that people who are highly identified with their ingroup are motivated to protect their perception of the ingroup's moral worth, and thus set higher confirmatory standards before admitting that their ingroup committed an injustice (Miron, Branscombe, & Biernat, 2010) . In addition, our finding that inducing a more expansive circle of moral regard eliminated shifting moral standards provides further support for a motivational explanation. By leading people to believe that they should treat more groups with moral concern, a more expansive circle of moral regard may effectively reduce higher-SDO people's motivation to preserve perceived intergroup differences in morality. Future research could seek to disentangle these explanations, for instance by measuring poten-tial mediators (e.g., stereotype endorsement, desire to legitimize hierarchy) corresponding to these separate mechanisms.
One question that could be raised regarding our findings is whether similar effects would have been observed for any other evaluative dimension besides morality (e.g., incompetence). We see this as unlikely for several reasons. First, such generalization across different domains would be inconsistent with previous research, which has found that shifting standards effects are observed only for the specific dimensions on which target groups are stereotyped (Biernat, Manis, & Nelson, 1991) . Thus, for instance, because gay men are not stereotyped as incompetent, we would not expect differences between gay and straight men on standards of incompetence. Moreover, if our assessment of moral standards were tapping into negative evaluation more generally (rather than morality in particular), we would have expected shifting standards effects to emerge also for the Asian target in Study 2. The fact that we did not find such an effect in Study 2 lends support for the notion that our findings are indeed specific to perceptions of morality. However, one might argue that dislike, which was the alternative dimension considered in Study 2, represents an affective reaction rather than an evaluative dimension, and that this might account for the differences from the pattern we observed on the moral dimension. We note, however, that previous research has conceptualized dislike as an evaluative dimension (e.g., Bohner & Dickel, 2011; Ferguson & Bargh, 2004) . Nevertheless, future research may benefit from directly manipulating other dimensions of evaluation (e.g., examining shifting standards for competence in addition to morality), which would help to further clarify whether the shifting standards effects observed in the present work are specific to morality.
A potential limitation of the present research is that we did not differentiate between the different domains of morality described by other research (e.g., Haidt & Kesebir, 2010) . For instance, we did not examine shifting moral standards separately for the five moral foundations (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010) . We instead focused on impressions of others' morality collapsing across these various dimensions, following other researchers who have examined global impressions of people as moral or immoral across several moral dimensions (e.g., Janoff-Bulman, Sheik, & Hepp, 2009; Phalet & Poppe, 1997) . We believe that this is appropriate, because stigmatized groups can often be stereotyped as immoral across several moral dimensions. For instance, Blacks are stereotyped as violent (Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & Davies, 2004 ; foundation of harm/care), dishonest (Gawronski, Deutsch, Mbirkou, Seibt, & Strack, 2008 ; foundation of fairness/cheating), and criminal and hostile to police authorities (Eberhardt et al., 2004 ; foundation of authority/ subversion). Our findings that shifting standards effects were observed for moral behaviors spanning multiple dimensions suggest that our effects are not limited to one specific moral dimension, and instead encompass the construct of morality more broadly. However, it is possible that shifting standards effects may be stronger for some moral domains than for others, and future research may benefit from examining this possibility. For instance, the effects of shifting moral standards for gay men may be stronger for disgust-related moral violations, because the moral emotion of disgust plays a particularly strong role in anti-gay prejudice (Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009) .
Judgments of others' moral character can have substantial consequences (Brambilla, Hewstone, & Colucci, 2013; Ellemers & Van den Bos, 2012) . Indeed, some have argued that morality is even more important than other types of social evaluations (e.g., sociability and competence; Brambilla, Hewstone, & Colucci, 2013) in determining outgroup judgments. The evidentiary standards used to assess morality impact punishment (Cushman, 2008) and desire for restitution (Biernat, Fuegen, & Kobrynowicz, 2010) , suggesting that shifting moral standards may have consequences for how stigmatized groups are treated in naturalistic settings such as the criminal justice system. Given that people employ different standards when evaluating the appropriateness of punishment (e.g., some people are more likely than others to make punitive judgments based on the minimal standard of wrongdoing at which people are deserving of punishment; Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998) , the use of confirmatory (vs. minimum) standards in the justice system could impact the punishments that members of various groups receive. Relatedly, our findings in Study 1 suggest that shifting moral standards may influence the point at which members of stigmatized groups are deemed unfit for certain jobs, thus affecting job termination decisions. Future research may benefit from examining how shifting moral standards influence these and other behavioral outcomes, contributing to a more comprehensive understanding of moral biases against stigmatized groups more generally.
Moreover, extending prior work on group-based moral judgments that has focused primarily on one-shot judgments of a single action (e.g., Inbar et al., 2009 ), the present work examined moral judgments as a cumulative process-one in which people form impressions of others' moral character through repeated exposure to their behaviors (Wojciszke, Brycz, & Borkenau, 1993) . In real life, people may often evaluate others' character by considering a collection of behaviors that they have engaged in, and shifting moral standards help clarify how such cumulative evidence leads to divergent moral judgments depending on the type of standard and the target's group membership. Understanding shifting moral standards can thus help clarify when, why, and by whom biases in moral judgments toward stigmatized groups are expressed.
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